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It is well known that the profitability of horizontal mergers with quantity 
competition is scarce. However, in an asymmetric Stackelberg market we obtain that 
some mergers are profitable. Our main result is that mergers among followers become 
profitable when the followers are inefficient enough. In this case, leaders reduce their 
output when followers merge and this reduction renders the merger profitable. This 
merger increases price and welfare is reduced. 
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JEL classification numbers: L13; L40; L41 1. Introduction
In a symmetric linear Cournot oligopoly setting with homogenous goods, Salant, Switzer
and Reynolds (1983) (henceforth, SSR) showed that two-￿rm mergers are never pro￿table.
Also, in an asymmetric Cournot model with linear demand and constant marginal costs
the merger of symmetric ￿rms is not pro￿table. Unpro￿tability comes from the fact that
non-merging ￿rms react to the merger by increasing their output. 1 In the Stackelberg
model with linear demand and symmetric cost functions, Daughety (1990) showed that
the merger of two followers is potentially pro￿table, and that this merger may be welfare-
enhancing. However, he focused only on the merger between two followers resulting in
a ￿rm that becomes a leader, and why two followers should gain commitment power
by merging is not discussed. On the other hand, in the same model, Huck, Konrad and
M￿ller (2001) showed that only mergers between a leader and a follower are unambiguously
pro￿table.
In the present paper we show that in the Stackelberg model the pro￿tability of hor-
izontal merger crucially depends on cost asymmetries. We extend the analysis by Huck,
Konrad and M￿ller (2001) to the case where cost asymmetries and multilateral mergers
are allowed for. We develop a model where a group of ￿rms (leaders) choose output before
another group of ￿rms (followers). Followers may be less e¢ cient than leaders. We show
that leaders rarely have an incentive to merge. We also obtain that in the asymmetric
case mergers can be pro￿table even if costs are linear. This is true in two cases; ￿rst, when
a leader ￿rm incorporates follower ￿rms. In this case, the followers essentially disappear
and the newly merged ￿rm produces less quantity than the merged ￿rms did prior to
the merger. However, the price increases su¢ ciently to make this pro￿table. Second, in
the main result of the paper, we show that mergers between followers become pro￿table
when the marginal cost of the followers is high enough. We obtain that leaders reduce
their output when followers merge and this reduction increases as followers become less
1In fact, the pro￿tability of horizontal merger depends on the degree of concavity of cost and demand
functions (see for instance Perry and Porter (1985) or Faul￿-Oller (1997)).
2e¢ cient. We also observe that in both cases, welfare is reduced. Our analysis proves
useful because it allows to obtain that mergers of symmetric ￿rms i.e. without e¢ ciency
gains may be pro￿table in a setting where ￿rms choose output. For instance, a merger of
two followers may be pro￿table and they need not to be the only two ￿rms in the industry.
Furthermore, they need not to be even the only two ￿rms of their type in the industry.
Although we have focused on the asymmetric Stackelberg model from a theoretical
viewpoint, our paper is also motivated by the pro￿tability of the real mergers. An exam-
ple could be the semiconductor industry such as the DRAM (Dynamic Random Access
Memory) industry, where the leading manufacturers announce their production plan in
advance. The manufacturers that enter the market late correspond by adjusting their
quantity of DRAM produced (see Cho, D.-S.; D.-J. Kim and D.K Rhee (1998)). For the
last decades an overdue wave of mergers has been reshaping this industry. Another typical
example could be the market competition among domestic and foreign ￿rms in a devel-
oping country. The domestic ￿rms are often less e¢ cient and decide their quantity after
learning the output choice announced by the leading multinationals ￿rms. In both cases,
it seems plausible to analyze merger pro￿tability in an asymmetric Stackelberg model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brie￿ y outline the
model and we study the e⁄ects of mergers. In a subsection we study the e⁄ect of merger
on welfare. Another subsection provides a numerical example to ilustrate the results.
Section 3 tests the robustness of our results with a convex cost function ￿ as the one
proposed by Perry and Porter (1985)￿ and establishes that the main result continues to
hold. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are grouped together in the appendix.
2. The model and merger pro￿tability
We consider a market for a homogenous product with n ￿rms. Inverse demand is given
by P(Q) = 1 ￿ Q where Q is the is industry output. Competition occurs in two stages.
In the ￿rst stage, k ￿rms (leaders) simultaneously choose the output they want to sell. In
the second stage, the remaining n ￿ k ￿rms (followers), knowing the outputs chosen by
3the leaders in the ￿rst stage, choose also simultaneously their level of production. Apart
from their strategic advantage, leaders are assumed to be more e¢ cient than followers.2
The (constant) marginal cost of production of leaders is normalized to 0, whereas the unit
cost of followers is given by c ￿ 0. When c = 0 we are back to the standard (symmetric)
Stackelberg model. We assume
c <
1
k + 1 + k(n ￿ k)
< 1; (2.1)
so that followers are active and the equilibrium is interior. The output sold in equilibrium
by a leader and a follower and the market price are given respectively by:
ql =




c(￿k(n ￿ k) ￿ 1 ￿ k) + 1
(k + 1)(n ￿ k + 1)
p(n;k;c) =
1 + c(n ￿ k)
1 + k(n ￿ k) + n
. (2.3)
Contrary to the symmetric case, the output levels of the leaders depend on the number
of followers. We note that ql decreases with the number of leaders and increases with the
number of followers. On the other hand, qf is decreasing with the number of followers but
the e⁄ect of a change in the number of leaders depends on whether leaders are a majority





and decreases with k when k < f(c;n). It can also be veri￿ed that when k = f(c;n), qf
does not vary with k, and welfare is maximized.3
The expressions from (2.2) lead to the following equilibrium pro￿ts obtained respec-
tively by leaders and followers:
2This is assumed following the reasoning of the ￿folk theorem￿that relatively large ￿rms are com-
mitted leaders and small ￿rms are followers. Sadanand and Sadanand (1996 ) obtain a formal result for
su¢ ciently small amounts of uncertainty.
3This extends the result on welfare of Daughety (1990) to the asymmetric case. Observe that f(c;n)





(c(n ￿ k) + 1)2
(k + 1)
2 (n ￿ k + 1)
￿f(n;k;c) =
(c(k + 1 + k(n ￿ k)) ￿ 1)2
(k + 1)
2 (n ￿ k + 1)
2
We consider three di⁄erent types of mergers. (a) a merger of m+1 leaders, (b) the merger
between a leader and m followers and (c) a merger between m + 1 followers. In case (b)
the merged entity chooses output (only) in the ￿rst stage. A merger is considered to be
pro￿table if the pro￿ts of merging ￿rms increase after merger. In case (a) it implies that:
￿l(n ￿ m;k ￿ m;c) ￿ (m + 1)￿l(n;k;c) > 0 (2.4)
For a merger of case (b) it implies that:
￿l(n ￿ m;k;c) ￿ m￿f(n;k;c) ￿ ￿l(n;k;c) > 0
and a merger of type (c) is pro￿table if the following condition holds:
￿f(n ￿ m;k;c) ￿ (m + 1)￿f(n;k;c) > 0
Regarding cases (a) and (b), the results of the symmetric case analyzed by Huck, Konrad
and M￿ller (2001) extend to the asymmetric case: leaders rarely have an incentive to
merge, and the merger between a leader and a group of followers is always pro￿table. In
particular, condition (2.4) can be rewritten as
￿l(n ￿ m;k ￿ m)
￿l(n;k)
> (m+1), and it is the
same condition as in the symmetric case because the left hand side does not depend on
c. For case (b), merger pro￿tability can only increase when followers become ine¢ cient
because the merger has the additional positive e⁄ect of allowing some cost savings by
transferring output from a high cost ￿rm to a low cost ￿rm.
Proposition 1. For all m < k, a merger between m + 1 leaders is only pro￿table if
m ￿ k ￿ 1
2(
2 p
4k + 5 ￿ 1):
5This result parallels the results by SSR because cost asymmetry does not play any
role.4
Proposition 2. For all m ￿ n￿k, a merger between a leader and m followers is always
pro￿table.
Thus, with quantity competition, a merger can be pro￿table even if costs are linear
in the case of a leader ￿rm incorporating follower ￿rms. As can be seen from (2.2), the
newly merged ￿rm produces even less quantity than the leader prior to merger. Intuitively,
market price increases and this overcompensates the decrease in the joint quantity sold.
When c > 0, the leader-follower ￿rm internalizes even more of the bene￿ts from the price
increases because it reduces output less drastically than symmetric ￿rms would. Note
also that a leader has incentives to incorporate as many followers as possible.
Remark 1. The incentive for a leader to merge with m + 1 followers increases with m
We turn now our attention to a merger of type (c). The main contribution of this
paper is that merger of followers are pro￿table if c is high enough. In a Cournot setting,
mergers are unpro￿table because nonparticipants expand their output after the merger.
However, the pro￿tability of mergers in the asymmetric Stackelberg model is explained by
the fact that leaders reduce their output after the merger of two followers. In particular,
the marginal reduction in the output of leaders given a marginal decrease in the number






It is zero for the symmetric case and negative for the asymmetric case if c > 0. The
reduction becomes more important as followers become more ine¢ cient. This explains
why mergers are only pro￿table when c is high enough.5
4Note that the inequality in Proposition 1 is exactly the same in SSR for the Cournot case: for any
k, it is su¢ cient for a merger between m + 1 leaders to be unpro￿table that less than 80% of the leaders
merge.
5Note that this reduction is also more important when the number of leaders is small.
6Proposition 3. For all m < n￿k, a merger between m+1 followers is pro￿table if their
marginal cost is high enough.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is that as c increases leaders take less into account the
rivalry of the followers. When the number of ine¢ cient followers is reduced, leaders use
less their ￿strategic power￿to anticipate a large output, and consequently they reduce
production. Since followers act as Cournot quantity-setting ￿rms facing a residual de-
mand, it seems plausible that merger pro￿tability for case (c) follows the results by SSR.
In this case, SSR established that a merger between two (or more) ￿rms to produce a
￿rm of the same type is nearly always unpro￿table. However, this is not true when the
merger involves ￿ine¢ cient￿followers forming a follower. Interestingly, for example if two
followers merge, they do not need to be neither the only two ￿rms in the industry nor the
only two followers for the merger to be pro￿table.
2.1. Welfare
In absence of synergies, after the merger of m + 1 followers there will be k leaders and
n￿k￿m followers, which is exactly the same market con￿guration after a merger between





(1 + k)(1 + n ￿ k)2 < 0. (2.5)
Therefore, as far as welfare is concerned both types of pro￿table mergers have the same
e⁄ect: market price increases and welfare is reduced. Notice also that in the asymmetric
case the e⁄ect of the pro￿table mergers on welfare is smaller than in the symmetric case.
Intuitively, the more ￿ine¢ cient￿the followers, the smaller is the increase in market price
due to the merger. This is true as (2.5) is larger in absolute value with c = 0 than with
c > 0. Observe that our results contrast with those obtained by Daughety (1990): if
followers do not gain commitment power by merging, welfare is reduced.
72.2. Example
A numerical example is provided to illustrate better the range of parameters over which
the mergers analyzed in this paper can be pro￿table. We consider an industry where
n = 8 and k = 5.
Type (a): a merger between m+1 leaders is pro￿table if:
(1+3c)2
144 ( 36
(m￿6)2 ￿(m+1)) > 0.
This does not depend on c and is only positive if m > 3:
Type (b): a merger between a leader and m followers is pro￿table if
m(m+c(160￿42m)+c2(457m￿1824))
576(4￿m) > 0, which is always true for all m 2 (1;3).
Type (c): for the equilibrium to be interior we assume that c < 1
k+1+k(n￿k) = 0:047.
A merger between two followers is pro￿table if 122c￿1921c2￿1
2592 > 0. The last expression
equal to zero has 2 roots: c = 0:01 and c = 0:05: Therefore, when c 2 (0:01;0:047) the
equilibrium is interior, and a merger between two followers is pro￿table. Observe also
that price prior to merger was 3c+1
24 and after the merger is 2c+1
18 . Thus, when the merger
is pro￿table (c 2 (0:01;0:047)) market price increases and welfare is reduced.
3. Extensions
To test the robustness of our main result, it is natural to analyze mergers of type (c)
following the formulation by Perry and Porter (1985). For simplicity, we consider an
industry with one leader and n followers where the (constant) marginal cost of production
of the leader is normalized to 0, whereas the cost of followers is given by the following
function: c(q) = cq + d
2q2. We assume c < 2
4+n so that followers are active in equilibrium.
Note that in this case, since the merger may give rise to scale economies, it does not reduce
the number of ￿rms. When d = 1, it can be veri￿ed that pro￿ts of a follower before and















The intuition is the same as in Proposition 3: as c increases the leader reduces pro-
duction, and this reduction renders the merger pro￿table. In particular, it can be veri￿ed
that, for any d, the variation in the leader￿ s production due to the merger of m follow-
ers is given by the following expression: ￿
c(￿1+m)m
2(1+d)(d+m) < 0. Observe that the reduction
becomes more important as c increases but is smaller as the followers have more convex
costs (namely, d increases).
On the other hand, it can easily be veri￿ed that price variation due to the merger of
two followers is given by the following expression:
12(n+1)￿44c+cn(￿84+n(￿28+9n(2+n)))
6(1+n)(2+n) , which
is positive for all c < 2
4+n and n ￿ 2. Thus, the merger increases price, and welfare is
reduced.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we showed that in a simple generalized Stackelberg market with k leaders
and n￿k followers although ￿rms choose output some mergers are pro￿table. In a merger
between a leader and a group of followers the joint payo⁄of the merging ￿rms is increased
independently of the ￿ine¢ ciency￿ of the followers. On the other hand, as followers
become relatively less e¢ cient, leaders take less into account the rivalry of the followers
and, therefore, some of the nonmerging ￿rms reduce their output after the merger. In this
case, when the number of ine¢ cient followers is reduced, leaders use less their ￿strategic
power￿to anticipate a large output. The consequence is that leaders cut production and
this reduction renders the merger between followers pro￿table. Therefore, although in
a linear (symmetric or asymmetric) Cournot model the merger of two symmetric ￿rms
is not pro￿table, we found that merger pro￿tability with quantity competition depends
crucially on the involved ￿rms￿￿strategic power￿and on cost asymmetries.
Regarding the welfare analysis, the literature on the subject states that, in the absence
9of any cost saving, 6 many welfare-lowering mergers are unpro￿table for the involved ￿rms
(and thus unlikely to happen), and that some pro￿table mergers are welfare raising (see
for instance Daughety (1990)). However, we showed that in a two-stage oligopoly model
where ￿rms compete in quantities, welfare-lowering mergers may also be pro￿table.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The merger is pro￿table if:




(1￿k+n) > 0. We can see
that it does not depend on c if c > 0: It is only positive if m ￿ k ￿ 1
2(
2 p
4k + 5 ￿ 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. For the symmetric case (c = 0) the merger is pro￿table if:
￿l(n ￿ m;k;0) ￿ m￿f(n;k;0) ￿ ￿l(n;k;0) = m2
(1+k)2(1￿m+n￿k)(1+n￿k)2 > 0. Then, we only
have to check that
@(￿l(n￿m;k;c)￿m￿f(n;k;c)￿￿l(n;k;c))





(1+m)2 ) > 0.
Proof of Remark 1. The merger of a leader and m + 1 followers is pro￿table
if: ￿l(n ￿ m;k;c) ￿ m￿f(n;k;c) ￿ ￿l(n;k;c) = ￿m(n;k;m;c) > 0. Therefore, we















(1￿k+n)2 > 0. Then, ￿c2(1 + k2) +
2(c￿1)ck
￿1+k￿n can be written as
￿c(1+k2￿k3+n+k2n)+2k
1+n￿k which is a decreasing function of c. We only have to check that this
expression is positive when evaluated at the highest possible c given by (2.1). In this case,
the expression equals to
(￿1+k2)(￿1+k￿n)
￿1+k2￿k(1+n) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. This merger is pro￿table if ￿f(n ￿ m;k;c) ￿ (m +
1)￿f(n;k;c) = ￿m(n;k;m;c) > 0. If we denote the number of followers by s, (s = n￿k),
the incentives to merge can be also written as a function of s:




(1+s)2(1+k)2 : It is tedious but straightforward to show
that
@2￿m(s;k;c;m)
@2c < 0 and thus, ￿m(s;k;c;m) is a concave function. Also, 9 c1;c2 such
6See Farrell and Shapiro (1990) for a formal de￿nition of mergers creating ￿synergies￿ so that the
marginal costs of the ￿rms do not remain unchanged after the merger.









1+m￿m(m￿s+k(￿1+m￿s)(1+s))2 , being c1 < c2. Condition
(2.1) is equivalent to c < 1
1+k(1+s) < 1. Then, we have that c2 > 1
1+k(1+s) 8k;s;m > 0. We
have 2 di⁄erent cases:
1) When m > s ￿ 1
2(
2 p
4s + 5 ￿ 1). Note that this condition is exactly the same in
SSR for the Cournot case (here means that at least 80% of the followers merge). In this
case, ￿m(s;k;m;0) > 0, c1 < 0 and 8c < 1
1+k(1+s) a merger between m + 1 followers is
pro￿table.
2) When m ￿ s ￿ 1
2(
2 p
4s + 5 ￿ 1), we have that ￿m(s;k;m;0) ￿ 0, c1 ￿ 0 and
￿m(s;k;m;c) ￿ 0 8c ￿ c1. Then a merger between m + 1 followers is only pro￿table if
c > c1.





72(4+3n)2 > 0. We have two di⁄erent cases:
If n = 2, then ￿a(c;2;2) ￿ ￿b(c;2) =
9+(42￿191c)
5760 which is positive for all c < 2
4+n = 1
3.
If n ￿ 3, then ￿a(0;n;2)￿￿b(0;n) = 5
2(4+3n)2 ￿ 3
8(2+n)2 which is negative for all n ￿ 3.














￿1088+n(16+3n)(64+7n(16+3n)) . It is straightforward to check that
c1 < 2
4+n < c2. We note also that c1 > 0 if n ￿ 3. Then, the merger is only pro￿table
when c > c1.
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